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FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THEIR CRITICS*
Hilary Charlesworth**

The papers in this special edition of Third World Legal Studies
focus on the relationship of women to the body of international human
rights law. In this paper I want to consider what feminist critiques of
international law, and the critiques of the critiques, might contribute
to this subject.
I. Feminist Criticism of International Law
Feminist critiques of international law are at a very early stage.
Most international lawyers, even those with a critical bent, have
typically regarded their discipline as gender-free, long after feminist
critiques of other areas of law have underlined the pervasiveness of
gendered assumptions in national legal systems. International lawyers
often see themselves as outsiders, crusaders of principle, of
unfashionable virtue, and they have generally found it hard to accept
that their tools and concepts may be open to challenge on the basis that
they create another class of outsiders-women.
At the most general level, feminist analysis of international law
involves searching for the silences of the discipline. It means
examining the structures and the substance of the international legal
system to see how women are incorporated into it. It offers a
challenge to the implicit liberalism of the dominant theories about

An earlier version of this paper was given at the International Law panel at the Annual Meeting
of the American Association of Law Schools, Orlando, Florida, January 6, 1994. Research for this paper
was made possible by a grant from the Australian Research Council. This paper is dedicated to the
memory of my teacher and friend, Dr. Meredith Borthwick, who first introduced me to the worlds outside
my own.
University of Adelaide.
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international law-the idea that international law simply sets a
structure by which the actors within it can pursue their vision of the
good life-by asserting that international law has a gender, a
fundamental, if sometimes subtly manifested, bias in favour of men.2
There are other "outsider" discourses in international law that
have unsettled its calm surface, but feminist analysis is fundamentally
different from these. Feminist analyses of international law have
sometimes been seen as having conceptual links with the longstanding
critique of the traditional canon of international law by nations of the
"South" as western and imperial.' But although these critiques may
share a questioning of western "scientific" objectivity as reflected in
international law, the critiques of the "South" tend to be much less
radical: they generally preserve the basic concepts of the international
legal order, such as statehood, and argue for recognition of economic
disparity.' They do not address the exclusion of half the world's
population from international law making. A similar silence is evident
in critiques of international law that derive from the critical legal
studies movement. The so-called "New Stream" of international law
scholars5 have investigated the way international law achieves its
authority precisely by denying its true nature. 6 They have not,
however, been concerned with the fundamentally male cast of the
international legal order. 7
1. See MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 66-7 (1989).
2. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to

InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); Symposium: FeministInquiries into InternationalLaw,
3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 293-479 (1993) (a useful bibliography is found at 581);
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda Dallmeyer ed. 1993).

3. See, e.g., Isabelle Gunning, Modernizing CustomaryInternationalLaw: The Challenge of Human
Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 217-8 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, GeneralIntroduction in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS

AND PROSPECTS (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed. 1991).
5. See David Kennedy, A New Stream ofInternationalLawScholarship, 7 WIS. INT'L L. J. 1 (1988).
A useful bibliography of "New Stream" writing, which includes feminist writings, is at 35 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 417 (1994).

6. E.g., MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 485; Nigel Purvis, CriticalLegal Studies in Public
InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 81 (1991).

7. See Hilary Charlesworth, Subversive Trends in the Jurisprudenceof InternationalLaw in PROC.
ANN. MEETING ASIL (1992).
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Feminist analysis of international law has two major roles, one
Deconstruction of the
deconstuctive, the other reconstructive.'
explicit and implicit values of the international legal system means
challenging their claim to objectivity and rationality because of the
limited base on which they are built. All tools and categories of
international legal analysis become problematic when we understand
the exclusion of women from their construction. For example, the
notion of statehood that is crucial in international law is no longer
unquestioningly accepted as a neutral institution that could be
Thus Catharine
persuaded to accommodate women's interests.
MacKinnon has argued in a national context that the state and its
major institution, the legal system, are a direct expression of men's
interests.' Others have developed a more complex view of the state,
for example as a social process rather than as a legal category or set
of institutions.'° On this analysis the state is not an expression of a
single set of interests, but has its own complex set of power relations
and issues that include gender.
What relevance have these analyses in the international legal
order? If states sustain gendered hierarchies in national contexts, this
is reinforced on the international plane. Martti Koskenniemi has
pointed out that the international legal notion of statehood operates to
permanently privilege particular voices, and to silence others."
Although he does not specifically identify women as being muzzled by
statehood, women in fact form the largest group whose interests
remain unacknowledged in the structure of the state and its
sovereignty. As international relations theorists Ann Sisson Runyan
and V. Spike Peterson argue, "Itis simply not possible to understand
how power works in the world without explaining women 's exclusion
from the top of all economic, religious, political, and military systems
of power. ... [C]ontemporary power relations depend upon sustaining
certain notions of masculinity and femininity, notions of what is
8. See Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar?

Feminist Analysis of International Law in

RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda Dallmeyer ed. 1993).
9. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1989).

10. E.g., S. FRANZWAY, D. COURT & R. CONNELL, STAKING A CLAIM (1989).
11. MAR-II KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 499.
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expected in regard to men's and women's lives."12 I do not want to
suggest that the institution of the state is inherently oppressive for
women. Indeed, in some contexts, the state may offer women great
support.
However, in its current manifestations the state is a
problematic institution that needs to be much more fully investigated
from an international feminist perspective.
A more difficult project is that of reconstructionof a truly human
system of international law. How do we change the conceptual
foundations of international law? How do we make gender a
fundamental category of analysis? Such a task seems easier in areas
such as history and anthropology that deal directly with individuals in
society. International law, like international relations theory, is at one
remove, premised on a separation of the domestic and the
international. 13
The tentative and partial nature of feminist
reconstruction is inevitable. We are still seeking to understand the
pervasiveness of the gendered aspects of our world. We are still
developing new ways of theorizing. We have no historical experience
of power on which to draw in our reconstruction. At this stage in
feminist analysis of international law, then, deconstruction and
reconstruction are difficult to separate.
Deconstruction has
transformative potential because it reduces the imaginative grip of the
traditional theories. In this sense, all feminist theories are subversive
strategies. They are "forms of guerrilla warfare, striking out at points
of patriarchy's greatest weakness, its blindspots. 14 They reveal the
"partial and partisan instead of the universal or representative position"
of patriarchal discourse. 5
But, as Elizabeth Grosz observes, feminist theory inevitably
involves an intricate balancing between conceptually inimical forces
that usually goes unarticulated.16 Feminist analysis, says Grosz, is
12. Ann Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, The Radical Futureof Realism: Feminist Subversions
of IR Theory, 16 ALTERNATIVES 67, 87 (1991).
13. Rebecca Grant, The Sources of Gender Bias in InternationalRelations Theory in GENDER AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 8, 22 (Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland eds. 1991).
14. Elizabeth Gross, What is Feminist Theory? in FEMINIST CHALLENGES: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY 197 (Carole Pateman & Elizabeth Gross eds. 1986).
15. Id.
16. Elizabeth Grosz, A Note on Essentialism and Difference in FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE: CRITIQUE
AND CONSTRUCT 332 (Sneja Gunew ed. 1990).
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both a reaction to "the overwhelming masculinity of privileged and
historically dominant knowledges, acting as a kind of counterweight
to the imbalances resulting from the male monopoly of the production
and reception of knowledges" and at the same time a response to the
political goals of feminist struggles." The dual commitments of
feminist theory co-exist uneasily: the first requires intellectual rigour,
in male terms, investigating the hidden gender of disciplines; the
second calls for dedication to political change. Thus, feminist
theorists are often criticized from both sides: by some feminist
activists for their cooption by patriarchal forces through participation
in privileged, male-structured debates; and by the masculine academy
for lack of "disinterested" scholarship and "objective" analysis."i
The tension between the two goals of feminist theory is nicely
illustrated by the two critiques I now discuss.
II. The Incoherence Critique
Fernando Teson is one of the few international lawyers who has
directly engaged with feminist critiques of international law. His
article, Feminism and International Law: A Reply19 responds to an
article, FeministApproaches to InternationalLaw, written by Christine
Chinkin, Shelley Wright and me.2" Teson's critique is a good
example of the male conception of theory evaluation identified by
Elizabeth Grosz. He sees our work as lacking objectivity, failing to
adhere to scientific method, simply confirming, rather than
demonstrating, bias in the international legal system. In his article we
are charged with producing a conceptually confused thesis, full of
"anti-Western bias" with occasional lapses into total hypocrisy.
Teson'S demand is for an intellectual purity of position, "untainted by
social and political factors which militate against or interfere with the
goals of scholarly research. "21 He criticizes the charting of feminist
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
33 VA. J. INT'L L. 647 (1994).
Supra, note 2.
Elizabeth Grosz, supra note 16, at 332.

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1994

ambivalences, the explication of a range of positions, most particularly
in our discussion of feminist critique of rights.
Fernando Teson describes his "main difficulty" with our article as
the conflation of "divergent arguments from very different (and often
irreconcilable) camps within feminist theory.22 His article has the
laudable goal of "disentangl[ing]... separating, analyzing, and
ultimately evaluating these interwoven but uncongenial threads of
feminist thought."23 The theory mismatch identified by Teson is the
use of both "liberal" and "radical" feminist analysis. He points out,
quite accurately, that we draw from a range of feminist writers in our
work, not all of whom agree with one another. I do not see this as a
problem. In our paper, we attempted to introduce a range of
techniques to the analysis of international law. In this sense, the
feminist project is less a series of rival interpretations than a sort of
archaeological dig where different methods are appropriate at the
different levels of the excavation.2 4 A pure, complete, self-contained
account of the position of women in the international legal system is
not possible without sacrificing reality for theory. There are many
women's experiences that would be lost entirely in a streamlined
theoretical construct.
The labels "liberal" feminist or "radical"
feminist are not particularly meaningful in the international context.
I prefer the image of a feminist explorer or (borrowing from Maria
Lugones,25 a world traveller, using different modes of transport
according to the terrain. As Elizabeth Grosz observes, "[fleminists
are not faced with pure and impure options. All options are in their
various ways bound by the constraints of patriarchal power. The
crucial political question is which commitments remain, in spite of
their patriarchal alignments, of use to feminists in their political
struggles? What kind of feminist strategy do they make possible or
hinder?26
22. Fernando Teson, supra note 19, at 648.
23. Id.
24. NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES 2 (1990).

25. Maria Lugones, Playfulness, World-Travelling andLoving Perception,2 HYPATIA No. 2 (1987).
26. Elizabeth Grosz, supra note 16, at 342-3.
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Teson is happy to concede that liberal feminism has "important
things to say about international law and relations.27 It is radical
feminism that is "inconsistent both with the facts and with a view of
international law rooted in human rights and respect for persons.28
I accept that liberal feminism is a valuable tool in these early days of
feminist critique of international law, exposing the way in which the
international legal system does not deliver on its promise of equal
respect for all persons. I would argue, however, both that Teson's
translation of liberalism to the international plane is very limited and,
more fundamentally, that liberal feminism does not go far enough in
responding to the subordination of women.
Teson's discussion of the absence of women from decision-making
structures in the international legal system illustrates the very limited
notion of equality he envisages. The well-documented absence of
women from the decision making structures of international law is
presented as a "statistical underrepresentation 29 but not necessarily
an injustice. Teson first makes the curious point that we cannot
criticize an undemocratic government for its failure to appoint women
to posts of influence: this would be, he asserts, a category mistake
(the issue of lack of democracy being in a much more serious category
than sex discrimination) and in any event all appointments of an
illegitimate government are morally invalid.30 We must focus, says
Teson, on getting rid of tyrants before we consider issues of gender
Would he say the same thing about racial
discrimination.31
discrimination? Teson's assertion begs the important issue of what
constitutes a democracy in the first place: is it a body politic run
along completely majoritarian lines? must it provide protection for
minorities? As Dianne Otto has pointed out, the much heralded
human right to democracy does not necessarily promise much to
women who have been historically excluded from full participation.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Fernando Teson, supra note 19, at 648.
Id.
Id.at 651.
Id.
Id.
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The position of women is not
necessarily improved by transition to
32
certain forms of democracy.
In the case of "full members of the liberal alliance"33 Teson
acknowledges an injustice in the underrepresentation of women in
public life only if this phenomenon is the result of states preventing
women from exercising their right to political participation." He
dismisses the notion that the great imbalance in political participation
between women and men is in itself a human rights issue.3 ' This is
a very narrow view of existing international human rights law. For
example, the definition of discrimination in Article 1 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women covers indirect discrimination and mandates equality of result.
Article 7 requires that state parties ensure that women have the right
on equal terms with men to participate -in the formulation of
government policy and to hold public office. In other words, these
obligations are not limited to the provision of formal equality-equality
on paper-that Teson assumes is the international legal limit.36 They
could certainly include the devising of quotas for women's
participation, a proposition Teson apparently regards as preposterous.
The problem with the formal equality endorsed by Teson is that
it offers equality when women and men are in the same position, but
it fails to address the underlying causes of sex discrimination. The
principle of equal opportunity, says Nicola Lacey, is "inadequate to
criticise and transform a world in which the distribution of goods is
structured along gender lines.37 It assumes "a world of autonomous
individuals starting a race or making free choices [that] has no cutting
edge against the fact that men and women are simply running different
32. See Dianne Otto, Challenging the 'New World Order': International Law, Global Democracy
and the Possibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 371 (1993).
33. Fernando Teson, supra note 19, at 652.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 653.
36. See especially id. at 653, note 29 where Teson reflects on the criticism of the 98% male
composition of the US Senate during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. "[Tihis criticism is
misguided. Each participating senator had perfectly democratic credentials, having been elected to the
Senate by a free democratic choice of the electorate. I cannot, therefore, see any real injustice, unless
feminists are suggesting that women are being prevented from voting."
37. Nicola Lacey, Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist Perspective,
14 J.L. & Soc'Y 411, 415 (1987).
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races.38 The failure of the "liberal" international legal system in
responding to the global phenomenon of oppression of women should
indeed make us questions its foundations.
Patriarchy is not a
temporary imperfection in an otherwise adequate system; it is part of
the structure of the system and is constantly reinforced by it.
III. The Essentialism Critique
The issue of essentialism has been a major debate within feminist
theory. Do women have a fixed essence? Patriarchal discourses are
usually essentialist in the sense that they attribute to women fixed
qualities on the basis of biological functions such as reproduction, or
on other "natural" or psychological characteristics. These approaches
are used to justify women's subordination to men. The problem of an
essentialist approach is that it limits the possibilities of restructuring
social and political life:
in claiming that women's current social roles and positions are the
effect of their essence, nature, biology, or universal social position,
these theories are guilty of providing them with a powerful political
justification. They rationalize and neutralize the prevailing sexual
division of social roles by assuming that these are the only, or the
best, possibilities, given the confines of the nature, essence, or
biology of the two sexes.39
Essentialism is also problematic because it is ahistorical, and
confuses social relations with immutable attributes. Moreover, from
an international perspective, essentialism does not account for the
historical and social differences between women of different
cultures.4 As Chandra Mohanty says, "Women are constituted as
women through the complex interaction between class, culture,
religion and other ideological institutions and frameworks. They are
not 'women'-a coherent group-solely on the basis of a particular
38. Id.
39. Elizabeth Grosz, supra note 16, at 335.
40. Id.
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economic system or policy. 4
For all these reasons, the term
"essentialism," or its cognates, biologism, naturalism and
universalism, have become, in Elizabeth Grosz' words, "labels for
danger zones or theoretical pitfalls" in feminist theory both from an
intellectual and political perspective.42
Is the project of feminist analysis of international law inevitably
essentialist? To a white, western woman international lawyer (like
me), this is a particularly troubling issue. The traditional claim of my
discipline is to a universal system of justice, applying to all nations.
Will a feminist reconstruction of the discipline produce a universally
applicable system? Should it? Are feminist critiques capable of
analyzing international legal principles in all contexts, or are they
somehow limited to particular societies? How can feminist critiques
accommodate the widely different perspectives of women worldwide?
One international feminist strategy to overcome the bog of
essentialism is to focus on common problems women face whatever
their cultural background. The issue of violence against women, for
example, is truly universal, prevalent in all cultures and has been
extensively documented. 43

But the tactic of identifying universal

issues for women is not without complexity: for example, there may
be disagreement about whether particular practices constitute violence
against women, and there may be deep division over the appropriate
tactics to deal with a problem. Moreover, the search for universal
women's predicaments may homogenize women's experiences and
obscure the position of women who suffer from multiple forms of
discrimination, for example, because of their race, class and sexual
orientation.
Does avoiding the Scylla of essentialism risk the Charybdis of
relativism? If all cultures are seen as special, resting on idiosyncratic
values that cannot be investigated in a general way, it is difficult to
make any assessment from an international perspective of the
significance of particular concepts and practices for women.
41. Chandra Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses 30
FEMINIST REV. 61, 74 (1989).
42. Elizabeth Grosz, supra note 16, at 335.
43. E.g., FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE: WOMEN'S STRUGGLES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Margaret

Schuler ed. 1992).
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Moreover, we need to investigate the gender of the "cultures" that
relativism privileges. Relativism is typically concerned with dominant
cultures in particular regions and these are, among other things,
usually constructed from male histories, traditions and experiences.
Arati Rao has argued that:
the notion of culture favoured by international actors must be
unmasked for what it is: a falsely rigid, ahistorical, selectively
chosen set of self-justificatory texts and practices whose patent
partiality raises the question of exactly whose interests are being
served and who comes out on top."
For the term feminism to have any meaning, it must extend
beyond local concerns. In this sense, as Vicki Kirby has written,
"essentialism is the condition of possibility of any political axiology:
the minimal consensual stuff that political action fastens onto is
already essentialism's effect. There is no outside this entanglement.
...
[O]ur fundamental complicity with [essentialism] is, strangely, its
enabling moment. ""4
Is a feminist international lawyer, then, obliged to avoid all
universal, global analysis of the position of women? I think we can
identify women as an underclass in the international legal arena, as
long as the identification rests on, in Maria Lugones words, a "loving
perception" of other women. In some contexts, "women" is the
appropriate category in the struggle against domination by men.
Feminists use the universal category of "women" for very different
ends than patriarchal theorists, and resistance to this feminist form of
universalism undermines its powerful theoretical and political
potential: theoretical in the sense that it is using a patriarchal tool
against patriarchy and political in its mobilizing force.46 A strategic
44. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse in
WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 167, 174 (Julie Peters &

Andrea Wolper eds. 1995).
45. Vicki Kirby, Corpus Delicti:

The Body at the Scene of Writing in CARTOGRAPHIES:

POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE MAPPING OF BODIES AND SPACES 88, 93 (Rosalyn Diprose & Robyn

Ferrell eds. 1991).
46. Annie Bunting refers to this as "asymmetrical anti-essentialism." Annie Bunting, Theorizing
Women's Cultural Diversity in FeministInternationalHuman Rights Strategies in FEMINIST THEORY AND
LEGAL STRATEGY 6, 11 (Anne Bottomley and Joanne Conaghan eds. 1993).
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path between theoretical purity and political principle must be
negotiated . 4 Gayatri Spivak puts this well:
You pick up the universal that will give you the power to fight
against the other side and what you are throwing away by doing
that is your theoretical purity. Whereas the great custodians of the
anti-universal are obliged therefore simply to act in the interest of
a great narrative, the narrative of exploitation, while they keep
themselves clean by not committing themselves to anything. 8
Feminist analysis of international law involves recognition of the
tension between universal theories and local experience. The language
of international law is itself universalized, acknowledging cultural
differences only in the most general and attenuated form. At the
beginning of the excavation of the gendered layers of the discipline,
the gender of its "universal" concepts and principles can be most
effectively seen when countered with contrary "universal" models. At
the same time, we need to develop "situated perspectives, 49 that
encourage awareness of the differences between women while also
recognizing our commonalities. Women have tremendously different
life experiences, but we also have "a collective social history of
disempowerment, exploitation and subordination extending to the
present. ° Whatever its cultural context, feminist analysis rests on a
commitment to challenge male dominance and to allow women true
autonomy. This political commitment provides an intellectual basis
for feminist approaches to international law. 5

47. Elizabeth Grosz, supra note 16, at 342.
48. Gayatri Spivak, Criticism, Feminism and the Institution, Thesis Eleven 10/11 at 184 quoted in
Elizabeth Grosz, supra note 16, at 342.
49. Rosi Braidotti, The Exile, the Nomad, and the Migrant Reflections on InternationalFeminism,
15 WOMEN'S STUDIES INT'L FORUM 7, 9 (1992).

50. Catharine MacKinnon, From Practiceto Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 15 (1991).
51. Katharine Bartlett has proposed a notion of feminist "positionality" that I think is useful in this
context. Positionality means the obligations "to make commitments based on the current truths and values
that have emerged from methods of feminism, and to be open to previously unseen perspectives that might
alter these commitments." Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 883 (1990).

FEMINIST CRITIQUES
IV. Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights Law
How do the feminist critiques of international law outlined above
apply to international human rights law? Traditional human rights law
has offered a blunt cutting edge against the massive violations of
human rights that women suffer around the world. From the denial
of the right to vote or to hold public office, to epidemic levels of
sexual violence, to denial of reproductive freedom, to inequality in
access to education, employment, health care, housing and financial
services, "women's freedom, dignity and equality are persistently
compromised by law and by custom in ways that men's are not."52
Unlike men, many women face persecution simply because they are
women.
Deconstructive feminist techniques challenge the universality of
the international human rights canon. They draw attention to the
significance of the fact that almost all human rights law is created by
men. Although there are more women in the international human
rights system than in other areas of international law, women are
marginal participants. For example, few women have been elected to
the specialized United Nations human rights treaty monitoring
bodies53 except for the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, of which all twenty-three current
members are women (and which is the only treaty monitoring body
that has been criticized by the Economic and Social Council for its
gender imbalance." The absence of women is more than a simple
"statistical underrepresentation," as Teson argues. A result of this
imbalanced participation has been the development of a lop-sided
canon of human rights law that rests on, and reinforces, a gendered
distinction between public and private worlds.55 Most human rights
52, Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper, Introduction in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds. 1995).
53. In 1995, there were no women on the ten member Committee against Torture, six women on the
18 member Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, one woman on the 18 member
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, six women on the ten member Committee on the
Rights of the Child, and three women on the 18-member Human Rights Committee.
54. See Hilary Charlesworth, et al., FeministApproaches to InternationalLaw, supra note 2, at 624.
55. For a more detailed version of this argument see Hilary Charlesworth, What are "Women's
International Human Rights"? in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 58, 68-71 (Rebecca Cook ed. 1994). See also Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private
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defined in international instruments operate in the "public" sphere,
which is historically the sphere inhabited by men: the state is obliged
to protect individuals from harms either perpetrated directly by the
state itself, or within areas traditionally regulated by it, such as
political and economic life. Human rights law does not generally
extend to the "private" sphere of the home and family where most
women live out their lives. Thus it has been difficult to persuade the
international community of nation states to agree that violence against
women occurring outside the 'public' sphere constitutes a violation of
the human rights of women. For example, the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1993, takes an ambiguous
position on whether violence against women amounts to a human
rights issue."

A feminist reconstruction of international human rights law would
not necessarily mean a simple collapse of any public/private
distinctions in its definition. A feminized international legal system
would transcend gendered public/private dichotomies, incorporating
and responding to women and their concerns. This is not to say that
distinctions between public and private are inherently problematic for
A feminist revision of
women in an international context.
international law may well exclude certain areas from direct
international legal regulation. A crucial feminist concern is simply
that any distinction be drawn in a way that does not devalue or
marginalize women's experiences.
What force does the critique of essentialism have in the context of
feminist reshaping of international human rights law? Radhika
Coomaraswamy has pointed out that the very notion of rights has little
resonance in many cultures, particularly the countries of South
Asia.57 She argues that the discourse of women's rights assumes a
Distinctionin InternationalHuman Rights Law in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds. 1995).
56. Seefurther Hilary Charlesworth, Worlds Apart: Public/Private Distinctionsin InternationalLaw
in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 243, 256-9 (Margaret Thornton ed. 1995).
57. Radhika Coornaraswarny, To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourseof Rights
in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 39-40 (Rebecca Cook

ed. 1994).
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free, independent, individual woman, an image that is less powerful
in protecting women's rights than other ideologies, such as women as
mothers. Implementation of the international human rights of women
must therefore respond to local and regional circumstances.
A favoured context for discussion of essentialist approaches to
women's human rights has been the practices of female genital
mutilation. While many feminists have urged strong national and
international action against these practices, often through the
elaboration of the right to health, others have cautioned against
absolutist positions that sensationalize the issue and present "us versus
them" positions.
Isabelle Gunning has made an interesting
contribution to this debate by arguing that "culturally challenging"
practices such as genital mutilation (or "female genital surgeries" as
Gunning refers to them) require -the critic to engage in "world
travelling," which means "multicultural dialogue and a shared search
for areas of overlap, shared concerns and values. '"58
Isabelle
Gunning develops a tripartite approach to discussion of human rights
issues in other cultures: first being clear about your own historical
context; second, understanding how other women might see you; and
third, recognizing the complexities of the context of the other
women.59 She sees the structures of international human rights law
as capable of responding flexibly to culturally challenging practices
because they are non-coercive and emphasize education. In a similar
vein, Rosi Braidotti suggests the image of "multiple literacies" to
visualise the global range of feminisms. This entails "being able to
engage in conversation in a variety of styles, from a variety of
disciplinary angles, if possible in different languages.'
Unlike
Gunning, however, who contemplates the possibility of creating
universally shared values, Braidotti insists that feminists must
"relinquish the dream of a common language" and resign ourselves to
simply "temporary political consensus on specific issues. 6
The Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 endorsed the
importance of ensuring that the international human rights system
58. Isabelle Gunning, ArrogantPerception, World-Travelling andMulticulturalFeminism: The Case
of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COL. HUM. RTs L. REV. 189, 191 (1991-2).
59. A similar approach is suggested, albeit less explicitly, by Annie Bunting.
60. Rosi Braidotti, supra note 48, at 10.
61. Id.
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responded to the concerns of women as well as men. This theme will
be elaborated in the Platform for Action at the Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995 (although, at the
time of writing, most references to women's rights as human rights,
and the need for gender analysis of traditional human rights law in the
draft Platform are placed in square brackets, making uncertain their
final acceptance) .62 The rhetoric for a feminist transformation of
human rights law is apparently in place. It now needs to be put into
action. This process must start within the law-making fora of the
international community, supported and monitored by human rights
and women's organizations.
62. UN Doc. E/CN.6/1995/2/WG/Revs.

